Abstract
This proposal defines a general purpose framework for storing contract-triggered
requests. It extends the execution header with a single field to store the
request information. Requests are later on exposed to the consensus layer, which
then processes each one.
Motivation
The proliferation of smart contract controlled validators has caused there to be
a demand for additional EL triggered behaviors. By allowing these systems to
delegate administrative operations to their governing smart contracts, they can
avoid intermediaries needing to step in and ensure certain operations occur.
This creates a safer system for end users. By abstracting each individual request
details from the EL, adding new request types is simpler and does not require an
update on the execution block structure.
Specification
Execution Layer
Requests
A requests object consists of a request_type byte prepended to an opaque byte array
request_data. The request_data contains zero or more encoded request objects.
requests = request_type ++ request_data
Each request type will define its own requests object with its own request_data format.
Block Header
Extend the header with a new 32 byte commitment value requests_hash.
While processing a block, multiple requests objects with different request_types will
be produced by the system, and accumulated in the block requests list.
In order to compute the commitment, an intermediate hash list is first built by hashing
all non-empty requests elements of the block requests list. Items with empty
request_data are excluded, i.e. the intermediate list skips requests items which
contain only the request_type (1 byte) and nothing else.
Within the intermediate list, requests items must be ordered by request_type ascending.
The final commitment is computed as the sha256 hash of the intermediate element hashes.
def compute_requests_hash(block_requests: Sequence[bytes]):
m = sha256()
for r in block_requests:
if len(r) > 1:
m.update(sha256(r).digest())
return m.digest()
block.header.requests_hash = compute_requests_hash(requests)
Consensus Layer
Each proposal may choose how to extend the beacon chain types to include new EL request
types.
Rationale
Opaque byte array rather than an RLP array
By having the bytes of request_data array from second byte on be opaque bytes, rather
than an RLP (or other encoding) list, we can support different encoding formats for the
request payload in the future such as SSZ, LEB128, or a fixed width format.
Request source and validity
This EIP makes no strict requirement where a request may come from nor when/how
a request must be validated. This is to provide future protocol designers
maximum flexibility.
The authors' recommendations on source and validity of requests are:
- The source of requests should be from the execution of transactions. More
specifically, transactions which make calls to designated system contracts
that store the request in account. The storage would later be retrieved by a
post-block system call to the contract. Alternatively, if the system call does
not need to be inherently concerned with rate limiting, it could rely simply
on emitting an event which is later parsed post-block by the system and
converted into a request.
- A request's validity can often not be fully verified at the execution layer.
This is why they are referred to merely as "requests"; they do not carry the
authority on their own to unilaterally catalyze an action. We expect the system
contracts to perform whatever validation is possible by the EL and then pass
it on to the CL for further validation.
Ordering
The ordering across types is ascending by type. This is to simplify the process
of verifying that all requests which were committed to in requests_hash match.
An alternative could be to order by when the request was generated within the
block. Since it's expected that many requests will be accumulated at the end of
the block via system calls, this would be difficult to enforce. Therefore,
ordering by type is the most straightforward ordering which ensures integrity.
Intra-type
Within the same type, order is not defined. This is because the data of the
request is opaque as far as this EIP is concerned. Therefore, it is to be
determined by each request type individually.
Removing empty requests in commitment
We exclude empty requests elements from the requests_hash commitment in order to get a
stable 'empty' hash value that is independent of the blockchain fork. For a block with no
requests data, the requests_hash is simply sha256("").
Backwards Compatibility
No backward compatibility issues found.
Test Cases
TODO
Security Considerations
Needs discussion.
Copyright
Copyright and related rights waived via CC0.
